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gree did not constitute marital property 
under § 8-201(e) of the Maryland Marital 
Property Act since it had "no exchange 
value on the open market." Id. at 591. 
The court then turned its attention to 
the instant issue, noting first that various 
courts have considered the same issue with 
varying results. The court undertook a 
case by case analysis of the question. The 
court noted that while some courts have 
completely rejected the argument that a 
personal injury award or settlement is 
marital property, other courts have con-
cluded that a personal injury case which is 
pending at the time of divorce cannot be 
marital property because ofits speculative 
nature. 
While the court was obviously swayed 
by this argument, and relied heavily on it, 
it is specious. The court has already al-
lowed a nonvested pension right to be di-
vided on a percentage basis, see Deer£ng v. 
Deer£ng, supra at 891, and there is no rea-
son why the same argument could not be 
applied here. 
The court then turned its attention to a 
series of New Jersey cases which have ad-
dressed the issue. In D£Tolvo v. D£Tolvo, 
131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974), 
the court held that potential damages in a 
personal injury case which occurred dur-
ing marriage was a chose in action and, as 
such, constituted marital property acquired 
by the spouse during marriage and was 
subject to equitable distribution upon dis-
solution of the marriage. D£Tolvo was af-
firmed in Landwehr v. Landwehr, 200 N.J. 
Super. 56, 490 A.2d 342 (1985). 
Reaching a contrary decision was Amato 
v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210,434 A.2d 
639 (1981), another New Jersey inter-
mediate appellate court case. Amato in-
volved a spouse's unliquidated claim for 
damages stemming from a medical mal-
practice case. The court concluded that 
the damages were "peculiar to the injured 
person, to seek to be restored or made 
whole as he was before the injury." 434 
A.2d at 642. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the monies "represent personal 
property of the injured spouse, not dis-
tributable under the New Jersey Marital 
Property Statute." Id. at 643. The court 
carved out an exception, however, for 
losses which diminish the size of the mar-
ital estate, i.e. lost wages and medical ex-
penses, holding that such monies were "dis-
tributable when recovered." Id. at 644. 
The Supreme Court of Washington, in 
Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 
P. 2d 1207 (1984), gave a more concise ex-
planation of the above rationale when it 
stated: 
The physical injury to the spouse, and 
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the pain and suffering of the spouse 
therefrom is an injury to the spouse 
as an individual ... but on the other 
hand, if the injury deprives the marital 
community of the earnings or services 
of the spouse, that is an injury to the 
marital community. 
The court of appeals noted that Wash-
ington, unlike Maryland, is a community 
property state, but stated that the basic 
premise is the same: the focus is on the 
costs incurred by the couple and whether 
they reduced the size of the marital estate. 
The court of appeals then turned its at-
tention to the Maryland case law analyzing 
the Marital Property Statute, as well as the 
Report of the Governor's Commission on 
Domestic Relations Law (1978). After not-
ing that the statute and case law call for the 
court to consider both the monetary and 
nonmonetary contributions when distrib-
uting property in a divorce, and that the 
property rights of the spouses' be adjusted 
fairly and equitably, the court noted that 
the commission report explicitly noted 
that the theory of equitable distribution is 
that each spouse has a duty "to contribute 
his or her best efforts to the marriage for 
the benefit of the family unit." 305 Md. 
at 587. 
Given the above language, the court 
goes on to announce its holding in the in-
stant case. In one paragraph the court 
states that since the claim was not "ac-
quired" during the marriage, and arose by 
purely fortuitous circumstances . . . 
the claim is simply not the type of re-
source contemplated by the statutory 
definition of marital property even 
though, in part at least, payment of the 
claim would produce monies which 
would replenish marital assets previ-
ously diminished through payment of 
medical expenses and the loss of wages. 
Id. at 587 
In announcing such a broad reaching de-
cision the court of appeals has gone further 
than most courts which have come down 
on the same side of the issue. In Maryland, 
according to the court, not even lost wages 
or medical expenses which were originally 
paid out of the marital estate may be re-
plenished by an award from a personal in-
jury case. 
Given the facts of the instant case, i.e. 
that the parties were separated at the time 
of the accident, and that the wife incurred 
none of the expenses of the accident, the 
court probably reached an equitable deci-
sion. However, the court could have ac-
complished this without dealing with the 
more complex issue presented here by rul-
ing that under § 8-205 (8) of the Maryland 
Family Law Article that Gypsy had not 
contributed to this specific piece of marital 
property. In addition, § 8-205 (10) allows 
the court to consider "any other factor that 
the court considers necessary or appropri-
ate to consider in order to arrive at a fair 
and equitable monetary award." 
The court has left us with what may be a 
classic example of bad facts making bad 
law. By expanding its decision as far as it 
did, the court may have reached a decision 
that will be difficult to reconcile given dif-
ferent facts. One can picture a scenario 
wherein a spouse is injured while living 
with his/her husband/wife and expends 
great sums of otherwise marital property 
during the recovery process. By delaying 
settlement in the personal injury case, the 
injured spouse could conceivably deplete 
marital funds and later receive a windfall. 
Given the previous case law in the area, 
this does not appear to be a result the court 
of appeals would desire. 
- W£lHam Cassara 
Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.: 
INSURANCE COMPANIES' 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH ATTORNEY CONTINGENCY 
FEE CONTRACTS: A BROADER 
RULE 
In Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mob£le Insurance Co., 306 Md. 754, 511 
A.2d 492 (1986) the Maryland Court of 
Appeals, reversing the court of special ap-
peals, held, in a case of first impression, 
that an attorney stated a cause of action 
against an insurer for tortious interference 
with contract by alleging that the insurer 
had capitalized on his client's need for 
money by involving the client in settlement 
negotiations. 
The client, Donald Zorbach, was in-
volved in an automobile accident with 
another automobile insured by State Farm 
and suffered personal injuries. Zorbach re-
tained Ronald M. Sharrow as his attorney 
where, pursuant to a written agreement, 
Sharrow was to receive a specified per-
centage upon settlement or a slightly 
greater percentage ifsuit was filed. During 
his representation by Sharrow, Zorbach ran 
into serious financial difficulties and re-
quested that Sharrow advance him money. 
Sharrow declined stating that it is unethi-
cal for an attorney to advance money to his 
client and also stated that it would be un-
wise to approach State Farm with a similar 
request. Against his attorney's advice and 
without his knowledge, Zorbach contacted 
State Farm and requested an advance on 
his claim. State Farm refused and instead 
negotiated a settlement of Zorbach's claim 
for $2,500. Zorbach was directed to go to 
State Farm's office to execute certain doc-
uments to finalize the settlement. Zorbach 
went to the office and signed a release as 
directed. Zorbach was also requested to 
execute a document discharging Sharrow 
as his attorney and stating that he had ad-
vised Sharrow of his intention to settle di-
rectly with State Farm. 
Sharrow filed a three count complaint 
against State Farm and two of its em-
ployees, alleging that they tortiously inter-
fered with his contingent fee contract by 
negotiating and settling the claim directly 
with Zorbach. The trial court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a claim and 
Sharrow appealed. Sharrow contended that 
he adequately stated a cause of action which 
averred that State Farm, knowing ofShar-
row's representation of Zorbach, sensed 
Zorbach's desperate need for money when 
he contacted the insurer for an "advance" on 
his pending claim; that the insurer "seized 
the opportunity to exploit Zorbach's finan-
cial plight and induced a settlement"; and 
that "the egregious nature of State Farm's 
conduct was compounded by its require-
ment that Zorbach execute documents it 
prepared which falsely stated that he had 
terminated Sharrow as his attorney and 
had advised Sharrow that he intended to 
deal directly with State Farm." Sharrow 
reasserted the same allegations against a 
claims adjuster at State Farm who was as-
signed to Zorbach's claim. Sharrow as-
serted that the claims adjuster further in-
terfered with Sharrow's contract rights by 
stating to Zorbach that since it was Zor-
bach, not Sharrow, that settled the claim, 
Sharrow should not receive a fee for legal 
seryices. Sharrow stated that the claims ad-
juster's actions were undertaken by her 
solely to deprive Sharrow of the benefit of 
his contract. Sharrow contended that State 
Farm's conduct was coercive and malicious 
and that Zorbach's termination of the con-
tract was induced by State Farm's "oppro-
brious conduct and misrepresentations." 
The court of special appeals in Sharrow 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 63 Md. App. 412, 492A.2d 977(1985), 
citing Wilmington Trust Co. v. Clark, 289 
Md. 313,329,424 A.2d 744(1981), recog-
nized the general proposition that a third 
party who, without legal justification, in-
tentionally interferes with the rights of a 
party to a contract, or induces a breach 
thereof, is liable in tort to the injured con-
tracting party. However, the Maryland 
appellate courts had not had occasion to 
consider whether that tort applied to pro-
fessional service agreements between at-
torney and client and, if so, what type of 
conduct would suffice to create liability. 
Although a different rule had been adopted 
in a minority of states, the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland saw no reason why 
attorney-client agreements should be re-
garded differently in the eyes of the law 
than other contracts which are protected 
against tortious interference by third 
parties. The problem was not whether 
attorney-client agreements should be in-
cluded within the aegis of the tort, but in 
determining whether particular conduct 
by a third party is actionable. 
Upon analysis of the out-of-state cases 
supporting the view that attorney-client 
agreements do come within the aegis of the 
tort, the intermediate appellate court noted 
that liability was predicated "upon fraudu-
lent or unconscionable conduct that actu-
ally induced the claimant to dismiss his or 
her attorney and settle directly with the in-
surer." 63 Md. App. at 421. 
The court looked to Comment a of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977) 
which emphasizes that for the acts or state-
ments to be actionable in tortious inter-
ference with contract, they must be "im-
proper"; and under § 767 a chief factor in 
determining whether an act is improper is 
the nature of the conduct, e.g., "physical 
violence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
threats of illegal conduct which are ordi-
narily wrongful means" and thus action-
able. The Restatement analysis is not 
whether the person is justified in causing 
the harm, but whether he is justified in the 
manner in which he does it. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land left no doubt that a client has the good 
faith right to settle his cause of action with-
out his attorney's knowledge or consent 
notwithstanding the existence of a contin-
gency fee contract. The court looked to 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 
(1967), which held an insurer liable where 
it had the opportunity to settle a claim on 
behalf of its insured within the policy lim-
its but did not do so. In White the court ap-
plied a good faith test in determining the 
liability of the insured. For an insurer to 
measure up to the good faith test, its action 
in refusing to settle must consist of an in-
formed judgment based on honesty and 
diligence.Id. at 333. Just as a claimant has 
a right to settle his claim with an insurer, 
White indicates that an insurer has a right, 
and where reasonable and possible, a duty 
to settle a claim made against its insured. 
The court of special appeals in Sharrow 
attempted to define the restraint. imposed 
on the insurer's duty by stating that: 
If, to achieve its own ends, an insurer 
deliberately induces the claimant to 
repudiate his retainer agreement by 
means of threats, misrepresentations, 
or other coercive or unconscionable 
conduct, its 'right to settle' cannot save 
it from liability to the lawyer who has 
suffered economic detriment from the 
repudiation. 63 Md. App. at 424. 
Therefore, if a claimant indicated to an 
insurer his willingness to settle without 
the intervention of his attorney and the in-
sured responds in good faith to settle the 
claim, as its duty may well require, with-
out engaging in coercive or unconscionable 
conduct, there would be no improper in-
terference with the attorney's contract. 
U sing that analysis, the court of special 
appeals agreed with the lower court in 
finding that Sharrow failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. As-
suming the allegations of the complaint to 
be true, that decision was made in light of 
the fact that false statements existed in the 
settlement agreement. The court summar-
ily dismissed the effect of the false state-
ment-the certificate that Zorbach had 
discharged Sharrow - by noting the fact 
that the statement became true the instant 
it was signed. The other false statement 
that, "I have advised Ronald Sharrow of 
my intention to settle my claim directly ... " 
was dismissed because there was no allega-
tion that it had anything to do with induc-
ing Zorbach to settle his claim. The allega-
tion that a claims adjuster told Zorbach 
he would not have to pay Sharrow was de-
termined to have no basis ofliability. The 
court indicated that because the statement 
came after Zorbach signed the agreement, 
it had nothing to do with inducing him to 
settle with State Farm. 
The court of appeals in Sharrow agreed 
with the court of special appeals' analysis 
of the applicability of tortious interference 
with contract to attorney-client contracts, 
the right of claimants to settle their claims, 
and the duty of insurers to settle claims 
against its insured, but did not agree with 
the standard used to assess the conduct of 
an interfering third party. The court of 
special appeals' standard for actionable 
conduct was, that an act must be either 
egregious, opprobrious, fraudulent, co-
ercive, or unconscionable and manifested 
by threats, misrepresentations or other acts 
or statements made to induce the client to 
repudiate his contract and settle with the 
insurer. 306 Md. at 767. The court ofap-
peals held that standard to be too restric-
tive. The court enunciated a broader rule 
which defines as actionable any purpose-
ful conduct, however subtle, by which an 
insurer improperly and intentionally in-
duces or persuades a client to discharge his 
counsel and settle directly. 306 Md. at 
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767. After this rule, the conduct of the in-
surer need no longer be opprobrious or un-
conscionable in nature, but only intentional 
with an underlying improper purpose of 
inducing a client to settle directly with the 
insurer. 
The court reversed the court of special 
appeals but admitted that it did so only be-
cause Sharrow barely alleged a claim for 
tortious interference with contract. Shar-
row, on the basis of the broader rule, al-
though lacking specificity, alleged the ele-
ments necessary to sustain: the tort claim. 
Based on the facts and the court's analysis, 
it is highly unlikely that Sharrow had what 
was needed to prove the commission of 
tortious interference with contract. The 
court, however, supplied practitioners, 
who may find themselves victims of an in-
terference with contract, with the ammu-
nition necessary to actually prove the tort. 
The court emphasized that the deter-
minative factor in such cases is whether 
there was purposeful conduct by the in-
surer, or whether such conduct was by the 
client. If the facts of Sharrow's case showed 
that State Farm rather than Zorbach actu-
ally initiated the settlement negotiations, 
the purposeful conduct of State Farm would 
indeed be more substantial and the tort 
claim more likely to succeed at trial. Also 
absent from Sharrow's complaint was an 
allegation that State Farm's purpose in ne-
gotiating directly with Zorbach was for its 
own benefit. The presence of such an alle-
gation would enhance the success of a claim 
alleging the commission of the tort and 
certainly assist in proving the same. 
The Sharrow case sends a message to in-
surance companies to tread lightly when-
ever they may be in a position of dealing 
with a claimant directly. The insurer's 
duty toward its insured, heretofore rather 
ambiguous, does not extend to intentional 
conduct, however subtle, whereby the in-
surer leads a claimant to discharge his at-
torney and settle his claim. 
-Kevin S. Anderson 
Knill v. Knill: HUSBAND MAY NOT 
BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED 
TO DENY CHILD SUPPORT 
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel 
may not be applied to estop a husband 
from denying support to an illegitimate 
child born to his wife by another man dur-
ing the marriage, unless the husband's 
voluntary conduct in treating the child as 
his own gives rise to reliance by the child 
upon such conduct and such conduct re-
sults in the child suffering financial loss. 
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Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 
(1986). 
Charles and Cledythe Knill had been 
married ten years. As a result of their mar-
riage, two children were born. After the 
birth of their children, Charles underwent 
surgery for a full vasectomy. However, one 
and a half years after the operation, Mrs. 
Knill bore a third child, Stephen. Both 
parties acknowledged that Stephen was 
not Charles' son. According to Cledythe, 
the natural father was a former co-worker. 
Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for 
her infidelity and the marriage continued 
for twelve years with Stephen being reared 
and supported as a member of the Knill 
family. During this twelve year period, 
Stephen had no knowledge of his illegiti-
macy. Charles was named as Stephen's fa-
ther on his birth certificate. Additionally, 
Stephen was treated as "one of the family" 
and was thereby so known in the commu-
nity where the family resided. In the after-
math of a family dispute, Cledythe revealed 
to Stephen that Charles was not his nat-
ural father. Charles nevertheless con-
tinued to support Stephen for two years 
until Cledythe sued for divorce. Among 
her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested 
child ·support for Stephen. The Circuit 
Court for Frederick County held,that even 
though Charles was not Stephen's natural 
father, he was estopped from asserting the 
illegitimacy of the child in order to avoid 
child support. 
On appeal, Charles argued that since he 
was not Stephen's natural father he could 
not be ordered to support Stephen. Mary-
land law places the responsibility of child 
support squarely on the shoulders of nat-
ural parents. MD. FAM. LAW CODE 
ANN. § 15-703(b)(l) (1984). See also, 
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 794 Md. 183,448 A.2d 
353 (1982). Charles asserted that he stood 
in loco parentis during the twelve years that 
he voluntarily supported him. Since this 
relationship had been temporary in nature, 
he owed no legal duty to continue to sup-
port Stephen. On the other hand, Cledythe 
contended that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel should be applied to prevent an 
inequitable and unconscionable result. 
For the first time in Maryland, the court 
of appeals had the opportunity to address 
the applicability of equitable estoppel to a 
child support proceeding. For the doc-
trine's to apply that a party claiming the 
benefit of estoppel must have been misled 
to his injury and changed his position for 
the worse, having believed and relied on 
the representations of the party sought to 
be estopped. Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 
Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976). See also, 
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804 
(5th Ed. 1941). 
In Knill, by a 4-3 decision, the court held 
that a husband cannot be equitably estopped 
to deny a duty to support. In reaching its 
decision Judge Cole for .the majority re-
viewed decisions from other jurisdictions 
which had previously addressed the issue. 
While a few jurisdictions had held that 
equitable estoppel is to be applied in order 
to force child support, as in Clevenger v. 
Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 707 (1961) and the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 
154,478 A.2d 351 (1984), the majority for 
the court followed the holdings of the ma-
jority of jurisdictions which do not apply 
the doctrine to estop a husband from deny-
ing paternity and a support obligation. See 
e.g., Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 
114, 479 A.2d 833 (1980); Weise v. Weise, 
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
The court in Knill stated that in order 
for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to ap-
ply, the related elements of representation, 
reliance and detriment must be present. 
The Court indicated that the application 
of the three-element test requires that the 
voluntary conduct or representation of the 
party to be estopped must give rise to 
the estopped party's reliance and, in turn, 
result in detriment to the estopped party. 
In applying the elements of equitable es-
toppel to the facts in Knill, the court found 
the elements of representation and reli-
ance to be present. The facts showed that 
Charles represented to Stephen that he 
was his father and these representations 
were accepted and acted upon by the child. 
[d. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The facts also 
showed Stephen relied upon the represen-
tations and treated Charles as his father, 
giving his love and affection to him in ig-
norance of the true facts. [d. In regard to 
the element of detriment, the court stated, 
[T]he evidence in this case~ however 
fails to demonstrate any finimcial detri-
ment incurred by Stephen as a result 
of Charles's course of conduct during 
their twelve year relationship ... if any 
detriment was incurred by Stephen, it 
was emotional and attributable to his 
mother ... it was she who ripped the 
'cloak of legitimacy' off the boy when 
she revealed to him that Charles was 
not his father. 
Knill, at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The court 
concluded that since the elements of equi-
table estoppel were not satisfied, Charles 
could not be held legally responsible for 
child support. 
For the dissent, Chief Judge Murphy, 
opined, "I think the majority is dead 
wrong." Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552. Murphy 
